Is Ukraine’s staggering advance a turning point in the war?

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Jordan Heath-Rawlings As weeks of conflict in Ukraine turned two months, the Western world’s attention wandered. That happens now with just about any story, but especially with a story that for so long has simply been about slow survival, about brave Ukrainians resisting Russian incursions, staying strong in the face of horrific shelling or reported war crimes. Stories essentially about digging in and holding on. Russian forces had occupied a significant chunk of the country. Ukrainians were standing strong where they could, pushing back when they got the chance. But it very much seemed like a long war of attrition. That is, until a few days ago tonight, a major victory for the Ukrainians in what could be a turning point in this war. A senior U. S. Defense official saying Russia has largely ceded their gains to the Ukrainians. Near Haki, Ukraine’s second largest city. Ukrainian forces retook as many as 20 towns and villages in the east of the country within 24 hours. Right now, the Russian military is on the back foot, putin’s in a weakened position, u. S. Officials clearly watching closely how he will respond. Where did this rapid Ukrainian offensive come from? How much ground has it retaken? And how quickly could this be a turning point in the conflict? And if the Russian forces continue to flounder, continue to lose territory, and continue to be, well, embarrassed on the world stage by an enemy they were told would be easy to conquer, what happens then? What might Vladimir Putin do next?

I’m Jordan Heath Rawlings. This is the big story. Balkan Devlin is a senior fellow at the McDonald Laure Institute. He is a super forecaster for Good Judgment, Incorporated. He is also someone we’ve trusted to bring us wisdom throughout this conflict. Hello, Balkan.

Balkan Devlen Hello, Jordan. And thanks for the kind words.

Jordan Well, the world right now is hearing a whole lot about a huge Ukrainian advancement. Can you just explain it for us based on what we know right now, what’s going on on the ground there?

Balkan Devlen There have been very dramatic developments in the past week to ten days on the ground in Ukraine. Ukraine allowed two counter offensives, one focusing on the northeast of the country in Harkiev region and particularly in eastern Harky, Bob Last and the other one focusing on the south, mainly targeting the city of Harson, which is under Russian occupation right now. And this has been counter offensive that has been on the books and was expected in the past a month or two, but most of the focus was on the south. Although I’ll be happy to talk about how the southern front is going and the fight around Hairson is going. The really sort of surprising breakthrough came in the northeast around hercule. Where the Ukrainian forces basically break the Russian front and force them to basically flee the battlefield and manage to capture recapture. I would say territory is under russian occupation. About 3000 area. Roughly speaking. In this region. So that has been quite dramatic because it showed how Ukraine can actually inflict a major battlefield defeat on Russian forces and can take territory. So it has been quite an important set of developments and I would like to highlight one thing and that might make a listener’s job a lot easier. And when they’re listening to this episode, they might want to open up a map. There are lots of maps going around about the war in Ukraine. The ones we institute for the Study of War is particularly good. So when they’re listening to it, if they just go there, for example, and pick up the map of the Korean situation, that might make a lot more sense. When we talk about what front is happening and where and that might help them to visualize better.

Jordan I want to ask you and I know news coming out on social media needs to be taken with many grains of salt from both sides right now. But one of the overwhelming narratives is just the rapid speed of this advancement, particularly around Harquiv to the point where we’re seeing pictures of entire tanks left behind, stacks of ammunition. How could such a rapid advancement be possible? I mean, these are towns that Russian troops have been in for what, six months or more by now, right?

Balkan Devlen That is correct. But I think there are three reasons for this rapid advancement. Number one, the Ukrainian build up in and around Harkov in advance of this offensive have been substantial. They managed to force us to that particular front without Russians and Russian intelligence being aware of these major movements. By one account, Ukrainian forces manned Russian forces eight to one in that particular front. So they managed to assemble a capable and overwhelming force. While most of the discourse and attention was on her son, it’s important to note her son and the Herson offensive was not necessarily a ruse or a distraction, but it is a sort of simultaneous offensive in two fronts. So number one is that the Ukrainian ability to build that force sufficiently without being targeted and degraded by Russian strikes. Number two, the Russian forces in the region are relatively thinly stretched the most of the front from what I can read and understand here. I’m relying on military analysts and experts such as Michael Kaufman and others that most of those forces are either Rascovardia forces that are sort of the internal guards, internal troops, or the Socalled ElenaR Lohansky People’s Republic troops either mobilized troops or even their militias. So rather than there are some regular Russian forces there that were in position, but the bulk of the force were these less than stellar, I would say, forces of Russians available which break very easily. And of course Russians and Ukraine has managed to push with much more professionalism. So that’s I would say number two. Number three is that, again, as an occupying force. Russians do not have any kind of local backing in that sense. When the Ukrainian forces managed to push through, they knew the Russian occupiers there, knew that they would not be able to maintain and protect their flanks and their rear because Ukrainians population will not be necessarily friendly to them. So they wanted to avoid being encircled and captured. And this led to a rapid trouble, somewhat call it even a route of Russian forces and a rapid collapse of Russian front. So those three things sperry numbers and ability to Ukraine, to mass forces, the thin sort of stretch nature and equality of Russian troops over there, coupled with Ukrainian professionalism and tactics and the lack of any political support or on the ground support for the Russian occupiers in the region, led to this impressive battlefield gains.

Jordan In a moment, we can talk about just how much ground has been made up and how much ground is still to go if the Ukrainians are really going to push the Russians all the way back. But first, regardless of how the Ukrainians were able to achieve this, it’s certainly been like a huge public relations coup. This has reinflamed the information war and there’s all sorts of positive press and encouragement to the Ukrainians. How is I mean, do we even know how Putin and Russia are explaining it internally?

Balkan Devlen I think they’re in a pickle. They’re in a pickle for a couple of reasons and we can see that being reflected in the public discourse, in the TV debates and the fact that they are incredibly, they cannot believe that the front really collapse this quickly. So I’m not particularly sure the Kremlin manages to craft domestic narrative that can explain these away. Apart from the arguments that we are redeploying to other parts of the effort and so on and so forth. Their silence on the issue is actually, I think, a signal to the fact that they were surprised by the rapidity and the success of Ukrainian offensive. So I think it’s very hard to get into the mind of Vladimir Putin and his disclosed associates. But this might be the first crack in the sort of cognitive armor around Vladimir Putin and his claws associates that in the long run. They will win and this is all just going to be fine and the west will fold and Ukrainians won’t be able to resist too long if they just push through this six months. Eight months. Whatever others would come to Russia to back for ceasefire. I think this sort of sense of long term and time is on our side. That illusion is being shattered and you can see that being publicly discussed in a very controlled media environment in Russia as well, which also suggests that the Kremlin wasn’t ready for such an eventuality and did not necessarily send the speaking points and talking points to their minions in the Russian media. So I think there is an important sort of I wouldn’t call it soul searching but it’s surprise and facing reality. And that may lead I’m not particularly optimistic but that may lead to Kremlin to reevaluate its current position and assumptions about the sustainability of its longterm effort and its belief that it is winning regardless of the developments on ground. I think that shattered this Iranian success, shattered that belief that bubble quite significantly.

Jordan I know that the past week has been full of really positive images for everybody pulling for the Ukrainians and it’s certainly been probably one of the most encouraging periods in this conflict in a long time. But I want to ask you about the big picture. Does this offensive really mark a major turning point in the war or is our optimism getting the better of us right now?

Balkan Devlen It’s a very hard question but I think in terms of it’s very hard to say whether this particular offensive in this particular period of time will prove to be decisive in the larger war. But I think it does a few important stuff. One. It is. As you pointed out. A big psychological win for Ukraine and it is a big win in that sense for the supporters of Ukraine in the west because it enables both Ukraine and those who root for Ukraine in the west to point out to the critics and those voices that we started to hear more a few weeks back about the need to negotiate. The need to find a solution. Diplomatic solution now and all that kind of stuff by making the claim that Ukraine will never be able to militarily defeat Russia or recapture territory. Now those voices are being silenced and you don’t see them talking much and I think that is an extremely important part. So in that sense this will reinvigorate and solidify Western support and will probably push for further and increase the weapon deliveries to Ukraine and hopefully Europeans in that sense will also step up. Americans have been doing quite a bit but I think Europe needs to do more and there is more and more calls for example for Germany to send main battle tanks and so on and so forth. So this actually in that sense could prove to be the turning point in finally eliminating the suspicion and skepticism of a potential Ukrainian battlefield victory in the west. So in that sense it might prove to be an important now whether this particular offensive would lead or can be maintained and can be repeated in other fronts including the rest of Donytsk Oblas or Donbaso Mabrad Luhansk as well as in the south targeting Hasan and beyond remains to be seen. It’s not an easy act to pull off. There are resource requirements, force, degradation and all of the requirements. It’s not easy to maintain a tempo as such. So that’s going to be an important part but we need to be able to see whether it’s going to be maintained in the future. But it’s obviously an important turning point for Russian understanding of war, and that might lead them to question their long term assumptions that they might be on the winning path.

Jordan That was a great segue talking about all the other fronts in this war, because I do want to bring you back to the map you mentioned at the beginning of our conversation. There have been some huge gains made, as you point out, three 0 lot of territory. How much more does Ukraine need to gain to actually drive Russia back to some semblance of pre invasion borders?

Balkan Devlen Quite a lot more. I mean, even with this current success is about 20% of green territory is still under Russian occupation. So there’s still a lot to go. Even to go to the prefebrary 24 battle lines or front lines would require at least four times or more, four to five times more, the territory being recaptured and pushing the Russian occupiers out. So it is nowhere, in that sense, the end of such an offensive. And it will be a long war going forward. Some of the fronts are more well defended, more supplied, better guarded. So the success of Ukrainian forces in this particular battle and the rapid collapse of Russian forces may not necessarily repeat in other fronts. It may, because there are talks and reports of Russia’s inability to recruit more volunteer battalions, might force Russia to reconsider its for structure and might force them to partial or full mobilization, et cetera. But the manpower will only get worse. The limitations of the manpower for Russia will only get worse as others see this rapid collapse and Russian ability to supply its troops with ammunition and others would degrade because of the Ukrainian advances and strikes. So things might get a little bit easier in other fronts, but it’s definitely too early to be very optimistic or completely enthusiastic about that this would repeat. We will not necessarily, and hopefully I’m wrong, but I don’t think so, that we will not see the repeat of this rapid advances in every front in this war. And we see that in and around her son in the southern front as well. It’s a much tougher fight, much tougher fight than what we saw in the northeast, for example.

Jordan You mentioned recruitment, and there have also been reports of morale amongst the Russian forces being really low and command being disorganized. I guess my question, though, is it’s been six months. To your point, russia’s entire strategy has been basically to occupy and wait it out. Would they ever really pack up and go home? Is that even an option for Putin at this point? Is it an option for Putin? Depends on how he can sell it. Do I see that as an option for him to consider right now?

Balkan Devlen I don’t think so. But Putin and his minions are coming to an inflection point where they would need to make painful political choices. And I think this recent Ukrainian successes makes the choice quite stark. I don’t think they could continue to avoid significant domestic political costs of partial or full mobilization. Something would need to give, right? Whether it is accepting that this is a war and stop with that nonsense of special metro operation Lingo and declare either partial mobilization, complete mobilization, and then trying to bring in forces which will take time. They need to be trained, equipped, sent, etcetera. So we’re not talking about from today to tomorrow, but maybe three to six months period of bringing significantly fresh forces. Even if there is full mobilization, but there are significant domestic political costs to it, sanctions are going to bite even more in the coming months. Russian economy will continue to suffer and depriving and always suffering economy from important labor force would have its impact, et cetera. But the current morale and the inability of Russia to create sufficiently capable volunteer forces would also suggest that they cannot continue to keep the current title of gains they have and maintain the current operational tempo. So it will force them to make some difficult choices. What I’m afraid is that Putin may choose a third option in order to mask or compensate for the battlefield weaknesses, and that is increase his attacks and targeting of civilian infrastructure and cities that does not require troops on the ground through precision strikes or air force and so on and so forth. They might try to force both the west and Ukraine into some sort of a negotiating table by ferry more than they already did, target cities and civilians and civilian infrastructure as a way to terrorize and coerce Ukraine to do so because they cannot maintain a capable force on the ground without making significant domestic political concessions. So that’s also my fear that we would see a lot more war crimes coming from the Russian side as a result of this tough choices that would face in the very near future.

Jordan This is one of the last things that I want to talk about. When we spoke near the beginning of this war, one of the things I asked you about and that you even warned about was that when everybody thinks that Russia is losing or they should be doing better and the world is sort of turning against them and humiliating Vladimir Putin, that was when he would be at his most dangerous. You mentioned war crimes just now. We’ve all heard hopefully just talk about the potential of a tactical nuke being used. How dangerous is that moment when it’s going to appear as the Ukrainians are trouncing the Russians?

Balkan Devlen First, I don’t think we are there. I think, to be frank, the talk of a potential tactical nucleus is exaggerated. I don’t think we are at a stage kremlin is at a stage to consider that. I think there are bunch of reasons I cannot see the political benefit that would incur necessarily to Russia. It will not necessarily lead to without willingness to escalate even further, it will not necessarily lead to the political outcomes that their criminal wants. Right? So assume that they dropped a nuke on an island, I don’t know, on the Snake Island or somewhere on a ship in the Black Sea as a method to demonstrate, and the west did not necessarily respond with a nuclear escalation but continue to increase conventional support. What would Russia do? Again, you basically have two choices either you escalate further and therefore carry out nuclear strikes within Ukraine and with population centers, or you back down. So there are no good options using that and I don’t see Kremlin going that route. Plus I don’t see any other ministry analysts, don’t see any sort of preparatory work for such stuff. Those things need to be transported. There are signs in which if there is an escalatory dynamic being put in place, we would see the signs of that and I don’t see any except from the rhetorical flourishes which does not have its counterparts in logistics or reality down the road. So for that, I don’t think we are there. There are very few circumstances under which I would reconsider, I think the nuclear escalation component and that would include rapid collapse of all fronts in Ukraine from the Russian perspective and a very clear threat of Crimea being de occupied by Ukraine in forces there, I might increase my probability of a potential strike. But unless that happens or unless particularly feels threatened, I don’t see that’s going to happen. One thing about dictators is that they are survivors and you do not get to be a dictator in a system like Russia or for that matter, other places like North Korea or China by being reckless about nuclear, nuclear weapons, things that can actually kill you as well. So I don’t think that treating Putin as a reckless figure in that sense when it comes to nuclear power is wrong. He cares very deeply about his own survival as well and going on the nuclear escalation ladder is not a way to protect your survival,

Jordan Thank goodness, from the Ukrainian point of view. Now, we’ve talked a lot about what Russia is thinking and doing after this offensive. Ukraine has made such rapid gains, what do they have to watch out for? As I guess their lines get further into a Russian occupying territory. They’ve been moving so fast, what kind of difficulty can that create?

Balkan Devlen Like I said, I’m not a military analyst but what I would point out is the difficulty of maintaining such a tempo and the difficulty of stretching the logistical lines are two things to watch for. And of course, protecting the force is extremely important. This is a high attrition, high casualty structure. So replenishing Ukrainian forces with fresh forces, trained, properly trained forces, we’re going to be an important part, and that’s number one. And the protection of that force against Russian airstrikes and long range missile attacks is going to be an important part and I think that’s why Zelensky and others have been calling for more air defenses for that because now they’re getting closer to other Russian forces enabling them to strike further and more into the Ukrainian position. So those things need to be watched for that. They need to look for maintaining a sustainable tempo of operations given the human resources that they have. The force structures they have. The ammunition and the weapons that are being arriving from the west and maintaining that tempo at a sustainable rate while making gains is going to be the primary challenge and not to stretch too thin and then enable even a tactical victory for Russians to damage the morale that this current battle victories abroad will be an important part. So it’s always good to stop and think about what can go wrong when you’re particularly successful you don’t want to do that when you fail. You want to think about what failure looked like and what you need to watch out for when you are particularly successful. And this is the time the Ukrainians are particularly successful so it’s a good time to sit down and reflect on what can go wrong for Ukraine right now and minimize the potential and the probability of that.

Jordan Well speaking of reflecting on things this is the last question I have for you and it’s just I’d like you to think back to maybe March or April or May sort of after Russia had made advancements into Ukraine we were seeing heroic videos of Ukrainians resisting and trying to hold on to territory and sort of slowly getting pushed back but really fighting back as hard as they can and we all praised their spirit at that time. Did a resurgence like this seem possible? Such a tough fight back, bringing it right back to the Russians?

Balkan Devlen I think on the hindsight there was skepticism, particularly in the west that Ukraine may be able to hold the line or slow down Russian advances and limit the operations to a particular area but would they be able to launch a counter offensive to take significant territory? I don’t think many in the west were convinced that that was possible. Most were expecting a long war of attrition if you would like a historical analogy more along the lines of Iran Iraq war of 1980s rather than anything else. While most of the fight is along a very narrow. Narrow front where the territory changes sides in a few kilometers here. A few kilometers there but at a huge human cost this ability of your brain to push forward I think changed that perception significantly and that’s why I think it’s a very important psychological victory too that this is not only a water patriotic in the sense that this will continue for a while but bunch of Ukranians can engage in maneuver warfare and recapture significant territory and thus does not need to be long dragged out years and years of war of attrition where hundreds of thousands died over 2 km if there are enough resources provided to Ukrainians that they could actually capture. Recapture their territory. Expel the occupiers and can basically finish the job. So there is the potential there and this actually shows that those who are doubting Ukrainian ability to utilize the weaponry and generate the necessary force to do so might be too pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances and this is I think a good signal for us to not assume that they will not be able to push Russians out from all of Ukraine. It will be fascinating to see and hopefully we see for Ukraine.

Jordan Once again, thank you Balkan,

Balkan Devlen it’s always a pleasure to be on the show.

Balkan Devlen Balkan Devlin from the McDonald Laurier Institute and Good Judgment Incorporated. That was the big story. You can get more at The Bigstorypodcast CA, you can yell at us on Twitter at thebictory FPN, you can send nice emails to hello at Thebigstorypodcast CA and you can sing us a song on a voicemail by calling 416-935-5935. As you know by now, The Big Story is available wherever you get your favorite podcast and you know, we like ratings and reviews and you should know that if you’ve got a smart speaker, you can ask it to play The Big Story podcast. Thanks for listening. I’m Jordan Heath Rawlings. We’ll talk tomorrow.